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Abstract: Recent trends suggest that young people in Britain are increasingly rejecting electoral
politics. However, evidence suggests that British youth are not apolitical, but are becoming ever more
sceptical of the ability of electoral politics to make a meaningful contribution to their lives. Why young
people are adopting new political behaviour and values, however, is still a point of contention.
Some authors have suggested that neoliberalism has influenced these new patterns of political
engagement. This article will advance this critique of neoliberalism, giving attention to three different
facets of neoliberalism and demonstrate how they combine to reduce young people’s expectations
of political participation and their perceptions of the legitimacy of political actors. We combine
ideational and material critiques to demonstrate how young people’s political engagement has been
restricted by neoliberalism. Neoliberalism has influenced youth political participation through its
critiques of collective democracy, by the subsequent transformations in political practice that it has
contributed to, and through the economic marginalisation that has resulted from its shaping of
governments’ monetary policy. This approach will be conceptually predicated on a definition of
neoliberalism which acknowledges both its focus on reducing interventions in the economy, and also
its productive capacity to modify society to construct market relations and galvanise competition
amongst agents. From this definition, we develop the argument that neoliberal critiques of democracy,
the subsequent changes in political practices which respond to these criticisms and the transformation
in socioeconomic conditions caused by neoliberalism have coalesced to negatively influence young
people’s electoral participation.
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1. Introduction
During the last three decades, young Britons aged 18–24 have demonstrated a reluctance to
engage with formal electoral-oriented politics, such as voting or membership of political parties [1,2].
Turnout at general elections for this generation has significantly reduced since 1992 when 67.3 percent
of British youth cast their vote; between 1997 and 2015 youth turnout remained below 55 percent.
This trend, however, was reversed at the 2017 General Election with more than 64 percent of young
people turning out to vote [3,4]. This turnaround may not be a permanent feature of electoral politics
in the United Kingdom (UK), as polls since the 2017 General Election have found that only 54 percent
of those aged 18–24 remain certain they will vote in the next general election [5].
Moreover, this generation displays clear dissatisfaction with the current political system, and many
admit to having low levels of interest or knowledge about democratic practices and institutions [6].
While conventional wisdom suggests this reluctance to participate may be due to young people’s
indifference towards politics, a number of scholars, associated with the anti-apathy school [7],
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have suggested that the relationship between contemporary youth and formal politics is far more
complex. Their studies indicate that far from being apathetic, young people are interested in politics
and support democracy [8], but don’t trust the motives of politicians [9] and are unhappy with
political parties for being remote, hierarchical and centralised [10]. Closely aligned to the anti-apathy
thesis is the notion that young people are rejecting formal politics and are channelling their political
activities into alternative forms of political engagement [11]. Formal political participation refers
to actions such as voting, political party membership and contacting political representatives,
whereas alternative participation refers to political activities such as attending demonstrations,
signing petitions, political blogging and boycotting or boycotting products. So, while their older
contemporaries have maintained engagement with formal politics, today’s young people are practising
alternative politics. Therefore, it may be more accurate to describe young people’s political participation
as changing compared to older cohorts, rather than simply declining.
Our comprehension of young people’s disenchantment with politics is far from complete, however.
While existing explanations have provided differing conceptions of how the relationship between
young people and politics has transformed in recent years, the question of why younger cohorts are
adopting new modes and styles of political behaviour has not been adequately addressed within
political science. This forms part of a wider deficiency within the discipline as political science has
often neglected to investigate the origins and sources creating the growing resentment towards politics
displayed across the spectrum of British society [7,12].
There are two notable exceptions to this omission. The first is the proposition found in
postmaterial theory, which claims that in increasingly affluent societies, young people’s values
will shift away from material concerns and, instead, they will begin to adopt postmaterial values
and perform new, non-institutionalised forms of political action [13,14]. A second suggestion is
that the neoliberalisation of society has contributed to citizens’ increasing levels of cynicism with
respect to politics and consequently to the erection of barriers obstructing—in particular—young
people’s political engagement [12,15–17]. Investigations in youth studies have established the influence
neoliberalism has on young people in education [18], social policy [19], poverty [20] and transitions
to employment [21]. By way of contrast, the impact of neoliberalism on changing patterns of youth
political engagement and political participation have been relatively under examined; one of the
primary objectives of this article will be to address this gap in the literature.
Existing accounts have highlighted three strands of neoliberalism which influence youth’s
changing political participation: Firstly, that the neoliberals’ critique of democracy and their insistence
on technocratic economic policies has undermined the ability of political actors to respond to the
concerns of the citizenry. Secondly, that the disenchantment with politics has occurred due to the
influence of neoliberalism on how politics is practised by political parties and political actors and
the emergence of a conventional wisdom which has been formed around politicians’ motives [17,22].
Thirdly, that the material inequality which has arisen from neoliberal-inspired policy has led to a
reduction in young people’s ability and motivation to engage with institutionalised politics [23].
Theorists have tended to focus on particular individual strands as separate aspects of
neoliberalism, and there is an absence of consideration of the interconnectedness of these three features.
This article will address the limits within the current literature by documenting how all three strands of
neoliberalism form a matrix which contributes to young people’s disengagement with electoral politics.
Furthermore, many of the existing discussions surrounding neoliberalism’s influence on political
disengagement have investigated society as a whole. This article will give particular focus to young
people and how they are acutely subject to neoliberalism’s effects. Young people are not the only social
group to feel the pernicious influence of neoliberalism; people’s class [24], gender [25] and ethnicity [26]
are also characteristics over which neoliberalism exerts a stratifying effect. Moreover, the influence of
neoliberalism on political behaviour is felt across all age cohorts [12,17]. However, youth should also
be considered as an important category to investigate the outcomes of neoliberalism because many
of these factors are unique to young people as a social group [27,28]. Moreover, as we demonstrate
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below, youth have been saturated within neoliberal policies for significant periods of their lives and
are displaying different political behaviour to their older contemporaries and previous generations at
the same age.
Contemporary British youth have been confronted by a political system which is increasingly
removing areas of public interest from democratic consultation in a move towards neoliberal policy
implementation [16,17,29]. This is compounded by the internalisation by young people of the claim
that political actors are unable to make meaningful change and by political interactions which are
becoming increasingly coercive [8,22,29]. In particular, the transition to neoliberal economics has
politically disenfranchised young people, through the inequality that has occurred as a consequence of
the operation of neoliberal ideology in practice—this is particularly evident under current austerity
conditions within the context of the ongoing global recession [2,23]. In critically addressing these
matters, this article will enable us to offer new insights about how the ideology and practice of
neoliberalism in contemporary Britain has contributed to young people’s eschewal of electoral politics
and changing political behaviour.
2. Young People’s Withdrawal from Formal Politics
There is a considerable body of research indicating that young people’s presence in formal
electoral politics (such as voting and membership of political parties) has recently been in decline [1,6].
The explanations offered for this pattern are varied. For instance, one account identifies that this
trend has resulted from an alienation of young people from formal democratic institutions and from
professional politicians [30,31]. Elsewhere, it has been suggested that young people are apathetic about
politics [32] or they are too “stupid” [33] to realise the benefit of voting. Others have suggested that
young people’s patterns of political engagement and participation may not necessarily be declining,
but instead are changing. For instance, when qualitative investigations have asked young people
about their withdrawal from formal electoral politics, their responses suggest that the reality is more
complicated than a simple lack of concern or from disinterest. According to Chareka and Sears,
young people demonstrate “a fairly sophisticated understanding of voting and its place in the political
system” [34] (p. 532). They also exhibit a deep awareness about the political issues that influence their
lives [35] and believe that voting is important [36]. In fact, not only do contemporary youth have a
good understanding of politics and believe that voting is important, they are also keen supporters of
democracy [8].
However, there is a considerable body of evidence which demonstrates that young people are
deeply suspicious of the relevance of formal politics to their lives, which is why they often eschew
electoral politics. For example, they are sceptical about their ability to influence either politicians or
the direction of politics and believe that they are ignored in political discussions [9,37]. They are also
disappointed with policies offered by political parties, suggesting that there is little to separate the
policy direction of political parties [10] and that such policies are not relevant to young people [27].
Contemporary youth are also disinclined to involve themselves in political party structures as they
feel they are hierarchical and centralised, offering little opportunity for them to influence the creation
of policy exchange information with political representatives [8,11]. Consequently, there is substantial
evidence that young people are now replacing participation in formal politics with engagement with
alternative (often more individualistic) forms of political action (boycotting, attending demonstrations,
signing petitions) [11,38,39]. Indeed, British youth, when motivated by the prevailing agenda and their
inclusion in the debate, are open to political participation. This is evidenced by their relatively high
turnouts at the Scottish independence referendum, the European Union (EU) referendum, and the
2017 General Election [4,40,41]. Thus, attempts to explain declining levels of electoral participation
by young people as a rejection of political matters does not provide accurate insight into their
political behaviour.
Therefore, the evidence suggests that young people, while supporting democratic arrangements
and displaying interest in issues that influence their lives, do not trust the current political system or
Societies 2017, 7, 33 4 of 19
their political representatives. Consequently, they often choose not to engage with electoral politics
because they feel that it does not make a difference to their lives and they feel excluded from
political discussions. It is our contention that many of these factors which reduce the appeal of
formal electoral politics to young people can be traced to changes resulting from interlinking facets of
neoliberalism. Neoliberal critiques of democracy and the subsequent realignment of democracy with
consumer principles diminishes the relevance of formal politics to young people. This is augmented
by the prevalence of individualism—driven by the hegemony of neoliberalism—which makes
collective electoral politics unappealing to young people and leads to their increased engagement with
alternative forms of politics [42]. Moreover, the socioeconomic conditions that have arisen due to the
transition to neoliberal economics encourage young people’s electoral withdrawal from politics [2,23].
Therefore, we shall argue that young people’s ability to vote, changes in young people’s political
preferences, and their lack of voice in political discussions can be traced to neoliberalism, and that
it can be suggested that these factors coalesce to diminish younger generations from engaging with
formal politics. Before we address young people’s changes in political behaviour, we will investigate
what neoliberalism is, how it has become so influential and how young people specifically are subject
to its authority.
3. Neoliberal Rationality
The developmental journey followed by neoliberalism towards it current hegemonic position as a
guide to social and economic practice has not been a uniformly linear one. It has had to adapt to a
multitude of diverse institutional, historical, social, political and cultural milieus. Indeed, neoliberalism
was not conceived as a cohesive concept due to the apparent dissension amongst its original pioneers.
For example, while Hayek felt that homo economicus exaggerated the rational capabilities of individuals
and believed that there was a role for the state providing it was subordinate to the market, Von Mises,
conversely, was committed to the fully rational actor with a priori capabilities of economic calculation
and believed that any state intervention was tantamount to socialism [43]. Furthermore, as Munck
states, neoliberalism as currently practised should be differentiated from ideas that arose from theorists
associated with neoliberalism. While the ideas of the latter have certainly influenced the direction
of the former, no one neoliberal theorist has had their ideas uniformly converted into economic and
social policies [44]. Neoliberalism, therefore, has no specific ontology nor one key thinker; nonetheless,
there are certain processes, which influence both society and agents within it, that we can attribute to a
process of neoliberalisation [45].
Stedman Jones has defined neoliberalism as “the free-market ideology based on individual liberty
and limited government that connected human freedom to the actions of the rational, self-interested
actor in a competitive marketplace” [46] (p. 2). However, two different but influential theories have
sought to describe the processes of neoliberalism and how these have become dominant in the political,
economic and social fields. Firstly, the Marxist version has defined neoliberalism as the reactionary
reassertion of classic liberal ideology which has attempted to counter the collectivist social and
economic policies of post-war governments. This explanation of neoliberalism stresses the material
consequences of neoliberal economic policies through resumption of free trade, balanced budgets,
deregulation and upper-class privilege which impoverish the lower classes and increase inequality [47].
Secondly, a Foucauldian variant acknowledges the Marxist materialist explanation but places a greater
emphasis on ideational factors and understands neoliberalism as a productive process which constructs
the “neoliberal subject” via an epistemological transformation [48,49].
Paralleling the Marxist theorists, Peck has explained that there is a “roll-back” function to
neoliberalism which conforms to classical liberal economic principles such as privatisation and
deregulation. Furthermore, in line with those who adopt Foucauldian understandings of neoliberalism,
Peck has also observed a generative element within neoliberalism which he refers to as the “roll-out”
function. The “roll-out” stage, however, refers to neoliberalism’s use of the state to construct society
around neoliberal objectives. This function creates new notions of how society can be proactively
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recalibrated through the marketisation of formerly non-market domains and the creation of competition
to guide human activity [45].
The productive roll-out function of neoliberalism was first highlighted by Foucault,
whose published lectures on biopolitics have forged new methods for conceptualising how
neoliberalism organises human and social action. Foucault stated that rather than a form of
ideological control which is exerted externally, neoliberalism is a form of governmentality which
has been internalised by individuals who self-regulate and discipline themselves [50]. This process
is articulated in the work of Hayek who acknowledged that market rationality is not inherent
within the behaviour of the individual and needs, instead, to be galvanised and adjusted through
their social experiences. Moreover, mechanisms which facilitate the internalisation of market
rationality, such as competition between individuals, do not spontaneously occur within a laissez-faire
framework; they must be created through a conscious and active process of societal adjustment [51,52].
Therefore, contemporary society is undergoing a process of rationalisation in which the values and
objectives of neoliberalism are artificially introduced into social processes and the subjectivity of
individuals. This epistemological transformation has consequently created agents who are guided
by notions of entrepreneurialism and economic outcomes, in which the relationship between these
neoliberal subjects is coordinated by private concerns, consumerism and the competition for resources.
Governance has become a key aspect of the roll-out function of neoliberalism. While this does
not originate in the writings of the pioneering neoliberal thinkers such as Hayek, neoliberalism in
practice has matured and governance has become an effective tool at managing populations. It manages
conduct by forming best practices, founded on the application of the narrow set of neoliberal values,
across a diverse range of institutional settings. Subjects must invest in their human capital to meet
the requirements of economic growth which, according to neoliberal logic, can only be achieved
via adherence to a narrow set of free-market rules. Individuals become sacrificed to the project of
economic growth, but do not form the constituent part of a collective as governance conducts and
coerces its subjects to find individual solutions to dilemmas. Notions of citizenship and political
participation, therefore, are reconstructed under governance as personalised efforts by individuals to
advance economic growth via improvement of human capital [53]. As Brown states, under the sway
of governance, political participation is no longer about “contestation and deliberation about norms,
[as] there is no place for agitated or agonistic citizenship” [53] (p. 8).
The hegemony of neoliberal values, such as governance, balanced budgets and privatisation,
has been expedited in Britain by neoliberals’ prominent roles in sites of knowledge production,
the creation of free-market aligned think-tanks, support from members of the intelligentsia and the
uptake of these ideas by major political parties across the ideological spectrum [46]. The increased
application of neoliberal logic has augmented the internalisation of market rationality as people are
subject to increasing competitive scenarios over scarcer resources which require economic calculation;
job opportunities are becoming rarer, work is more insecure, wages are falling or stagnating and
obtaining the correct human capital is more complex and time-consuming [48].
While it has been noted that the increasing prevalence of individualism in today’s society is also
being driven by sources unconnected to neoliberalism [54,55], we suggest that much of young people’s
displeasure with formal politics is derived from the form of individualism instigated by neoliberal
actors and values. Contemporary youth have been socialised in this environment which promotes
neoliberalism and produces the “neoliberal subject”. As Woodman and Wyn have argued, not only are
they subject to the same entrepreneurial environment described above, the “‘neoliberal’ policy shift has
had a number of effects that differentiated this generation from the previous one” [56] (p. 266).
Today’s young people are expected to improve their human capital by submitting to extended
periods in education and perpetual upskilling while becoming increasingly responsible for the
costs of skill advancement for a jobs market where competitiveness is burgeoning due to precarious
employment [56].
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In the UK, many government policies to improve young people’s situations have been guided by
the logic of neoliberalism. New Labour’s New Deal for Young People, for instance, placed specific
conditions and sanctions on those aged 18–24 who were in receipt of Job Seekers Allowance.
Similarly, the coalition of Liberal Democrats and Conservatives instigated a Youth Contract which
placed extra surveillance on young people who were unemployed for extended periods of time.
Such initiatives frame young people as a specific social issue to be resolved, where the focus
resides upon deficiencies within agency and problems with the supply of labour not the lack of
opportunities or the prevailing socioeconomic conditions [57]. The individualisation of youth is also
reflected in the language of recent youth social policies. The 2010–2015 coalition Government’s
Positive for Youth report stated that that its aim was to “develop greater awareness of the evidence
that links a number of key personal capabilities (such as confidence and agency, or resilience and
determination) to key longer-term outcomes such as those relating to educational attainment and
employment” [58] (pp. 83–84). Indeed, the general direction of youth policies in the UK has been
towards supply-side solutions, which frame many young people as deviant or in need of upskilling,
at the expense of demand-side solutions, which could investigate, amongst other issues, the paucity
and quality of available work to young people, the poor pay progression for younger generations,
and why youth have been excluded from access to state initiatives that could improve their material
situation [2,57].
Furthermore, how academics conceptualise and understand young people has often been driven
by the dominance of neoliberal values and has, in turn, propelled the development of neoliberal
attributes among youth [19]. For example, the influential field of “positive youth development”
seeks to harness the potential of young people by advocating self-advancement and individualistic
strategies for improvement. Though this does contain progressive elements for contemporary youth,
Sukarieh and Tannock claim that this strategy is founded upon “pulling young people into the
workforce, opening up the spheres of education and youth development to market forces and business
interests, promoting the ideology of neoliberalism among the young and undermining the traditional
entitlements of welfare state provision” [19] (p. 682). Neoliberal subjectivity, therefore, is constructed
and reproduced within young people by their exposure to youth and social policies that are grounded
in notions of individualism, entrepreneurialism and competitiveness. Indeed, being saturated in
neoliberal expectations creates a tacit knowledge among young people about how they should behave,
act and choose [28,59].
The process of rationalisation, however, is not the only outcome of neoliberal hegemony for young
people. The increasing prevalence of methodological individualism and locating responsibility for
success or failure on the choices of the individual, camouflage sources that are outside of young people’s
control and which mediate the options that are available for them to choose from. While neoliberalism
becomes the sole arbitrator of what it is to be a citizen [49], structural factors—such as gender or
class—which provide different opportunities or disadvantages to individuals within the category of
youth become decoupled from explanations of young people’s progression towards fulfilling their role
of (neoliberal-defined) citizen [16]. Indeed, young people’s choices and preferences concerning such
matters as housing or the labour market are limited by the prevailing economic circumstances of the
society in which they live; however, explanations which situate these factors within youth’s transition
to adulthood become concealed behind the neoliberal logic of individual responsibility [59].
To understand neoliberalism and its effect on society, an analysis is required of how its economic
rules (such as balanced budgets, reduction in welfare provision and privatisation) structure the
opportunities and life-chances of agents in the material realm. This, however, should be combined
with an investigation of how the hegemonic neoliberalism constructs compliant economic actors
who self-regulate to meet the requirements of neoliberal guidelines. In this section, moreover,
we have demonstrated how these two components of neoliberalism influence contemporary
youth. Firstly, it appears that neoliberal values have a rationalising effect on young people’s
epistemology as well as constructing normative classifications of how to gauge success and failure.
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Secondly, neoliberal ideology seems to obscure structural factors that impede some young people’s
ability to navigate to destinations of their own choosing; simultaneously, neoliberal economic rules
reduce the financial power of young people which furthers their difficulty in making self-actualising
choices. How these material and epistemological components of neoliberalism reduce young people’s
political participation will be considered below.
4. Diminishing Democracy: Economic Sovereignty
Hay has provided an interesting correlation between neoliberalism and the increasing rejection of
institutional politics by people of all ages. He argues that due to the depoliticisation of government
functions and the scepticism that politicians can work for the needs of society, people have become
cynical of the motives of their elected representatives and believe that the legislature have been
stripped of the power to create meaningful change. According to Hay, it is under the auspices of
Public Choice Theory (PCT) that the citizenry has become rationalised into distrusting politicians and
political practices [17].
In this section, we develop Hay’s proposition that neoliberal critiques of democracy have
influenced how citizens engage with electoral politics. In doing so, we also consider a number of
additional aspects of neoliberalism that are critical for investigating youth political engagement,
but which are not considered within existing work. Firstly, Hay’s definition offers focus with respect
to the classic liberal tenets of neoliberalism, although it does not address neoliberalism’s roll-out or
constructive agenda which provides insight into how free market principles became embedded in the
conventional wisdom of society. Secondly, Hay predominantly focuses on PCT, which means that other
theories posited by the neoliberals which have influenced our relationship to democracy have not been
fully explored. Thirdly, Hay has paid attention to neoliberalism’s influence in political disengagement
across all ages, whereas we want to specifically highlight how young people’s distrust of politicians
leads to the former’s political disengagement [17]. As we have stated above, neoliberalism as practised
should be differentiated from the theories of the pioneers of neoliberalism. Our focus in this section
will be on some of the key neoliberal thinkers and how they have sought to reimagine democracy—the
subsequent sections focus on neoliberalism as currently practised.
While the neoliberals were predominantly concerned with reinvigorating liberalism at the expense
of government planning and collectivism, they also supplied an overlapping critique of democracy.
Increasing democracy would hasten intervention within the economy, intervention in the economy
would lead to social ills—because everybody would become poorer, not richer—and interference in
the economy would result in totalitarianism. While political freedom and individual liberty flowed
naturally from economic freedom, such state-directed economic interventions would result in a
subversion of the masses by demagogues who would make unrealistic promises to gain power.
Instead, democracy would be far more efficient if pursuing social goods through economic intervention
was abandoned and if politics followed the principles of consumerism and the free market [45,60].
The neoliberals’ critique of democracy, as we have discussed earlier, is wide-ranging and
comprehensive. However, what underpins their attempts to reimagine democracy is their repositioning
of economic freedom as more crucial to liberty than political freedom. Attempts to provide social
freedom by intervening in the economy are considered undemocratic because they permit small
groups of elites, rather than individuals who comprise society, to decide the direction of state
planning [61]. Moreover, political freedom is bound to economic freedom, so that efforts to reduce
necessity by restricting market forces will lead to political oppression and totalitarianism rather
than to emancipation. Friedman also stressed that “economic freedom is [ . . . ] an indispensable
means towards the achievement of political freedom” [61] (p. 8). While Friedman acknowledged that
economic freedom does not necessarily translate into political freedom, Hayek claimed that it is more
essential for preserving or creating liberty than political freedom. For instance, when Hayek was asked
about human rights abuses conducted by the authoritarian Pinochet regime in Chile, he responded
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that, “[m]y personal preference leans toward a liberal dictatorship rather than toward a democratic
government devoid of liberalism” [62].
As Biebricher suggests, the neoliberals intended that economic freedom would supplant political
freedom as the foundation for understanding liberty [60]. More importantly for our analysis,
the neoliberals contended that certain aspects of the economy should be beyond democratic mediation
as the majority is not in a position to make an appropriate decision about these matters. For Hayek,
rules which galvanise and support the free market must be beyond amendment from democratic
intervention as an emancipated society may only exist when supported by a spontaneous and
free economy [63]. Consequently, the neoliberals were asserting that limitations must be placed
on democracy, particularly relating to interventions in the market, and that the economy must follow a
one-size-fits-all approach. Thus, a large and important factor in determining people’s life course—the
creation and allocation of wealth—is no longer a matter for public deliberation.
PCT builds upon these neoliberal critiques of democracy. For instance, James Buchanan [64]
claimed that politicians were motivated by self-interest rather than concern for positive public
outcomes. He develops this critique from the position that all people are “rational utility-maximisers”
regardless of the context or settings in which such decisions take place. Consequently, politicians
will govern according to a narrow agenda which is focused on improving their self-worth and power
rather than acting in the best interests of society. Buchanan identified three factors which should
lead to doubts about politicians’ motives and of the capability of democracy to solve social problems.
Firstly, no voting system can accurately or fairly reflect individual preferences within collective
decision-making. Secondly, governments were likely to promote rent-seeking behaviour by diverting
wealth to certain social groups and a proliferation of those in such groups seeking government subsidy
in return for votes. Thirdly, that government agents would inefficiently increase the size of their
bureaus for prestige and to improve their salary [54].
These criticisms depict politicians as being untrustworthy and unable to act in the public good,
and also cast doubt on the ability of democracy to mediate social decisions. PCT is correct to emphasise
that politicians and bureaucrats are not benign operatives who uniformly implement programmes
for the public good and disregard improving their own position. However, PCT makes the converse,
but equally absolute, claim that all public servants uniformly try to increase their self-worth and will
behave in the same utility-maximising manner regardless of the environment those decisions are
made within. The assertion that all political agents act free from other motives or emotions—such as
tradition, altruism or ethics—is difficult to sustain when empirical [65] and theoretical [66] evidence
provides a different picture of institutional behaviour. More important for our analysis, however, is that
PCT presents the market as the remedy to these institutional failings, as the profit-motive counters
rent-seeking behaviour or an unnecessary increase in bureaucracy. The market also allows individual
preferences to be satisfied as these are not subject to the distortion experienced within collective
decisions. Instead, consumers can signal their rejection of the possibilities offered by refusing to
purchase (through voting) any of the available options (political parties). So, not only were the
neoliberals providing a critique of democracy, they were also creating a privileged position for their
economic ideology.
The impact of these thinkers’ critiques on neoliberalism as practised should not be underestimated.
Friedman and Hayek both advised the British Conservative Party, which instigated full-fledged
neoliberal reforms in the UK. Their ideas, in addition to Buchanan’s, also influenced the knowledge
disseminated by free market British think tanks, such as the Adam Smith Institute and the Institute
for Economic Affairs [46]. Consequently, the neoliberals’ evaluations of democracy have permeated
mainstream consciousness and have increased the discord between young people and electoral politics
by forming the widespread opinion that the state and its representatives cannot facilitate positive social
change. Diffusion of PCT into mainstream consciousness via academics, think tanks, youth policies and
politicians themselves has been an important factor in increasing the scepticism towards political actors
across all cohorts [18,67]. However, young people are more likely than their older contemporaries to
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express doubts about the current system of government and are particularly critical of the motives of
politicians [68].
More specific to young people’s criticism of formal politics is that political parties fail to address
the policy concerns of the young. We will discuss the socioeconomic status of youth in more detail
below, but the positioning by political parties of economic freedom as the foundation of liberty above
that of political freedom has often justified a limiting of democratic intervention within the economy.
As a result, there has in recent decades been a broad convergence of the economic priorities and policies
of the main political parties in Britain. Studies have revealed that as a consequence of this ongoing
process, policies that are directed towards the improvement of young people’s economic circumstances
are often absent from the rhetoric and policy programmes of political parties [30,31,36]; in this context,
the broadly common trajectory of economic policy offered by these parties and their exclusion of young
people from policy formation [69] leaves contemporary youth with relatively little scope to express their
preference for alternative socioeconomic policies at elections. A recent exception to the pattern of youth
electoral abstention was the upsurge in youth turnout at the 2017 UK General Election. The limited
currently available evidence suggests that may have in part reflected youth support for the Labour by
that party’s abandonment of the neoliberal economic consensus in favour of manifesto commitments
to improve the economic situation of young people and the poor [70,71]. In general, and aside from
that particular election case, if political decisions are continuously restricted by adherence to neoliberal
guidelines, and if an environment exists in which politicians are framed as typically untrustworthy,
then it is perhaps not surprising that young people will reject electorally oriented representative
politics and search elsewhere for methods of meaningful political engagement [72].
5. Depoliticisation and New Forms of Political Practice
Neoliberalism has contributed to the current scepticism young people have with electoral politics
by guiding political parties in the UK towards a hierarchical form of democracy where commands
from those in the leadership create policy free from interaction with the electorate. Many young people
display a preference for direct forms of democracy in which they contribute to policy formation and
feel that their opinions are listened to and acted upon [73]. The neoliberal method of governance,
where political authorities rely on coercion rather than on the exchange of ideas and information,
is likely to reduce the attractiveness of formal politics to those young people who aspire to create
policies in concert with their political representatives.
The critiques of democracy by the neoliberals discussed above have certainly influenced
neoliberalism in practice. By positioning free market principles as the answer to democratic
failings, neoliberalism in practice has sought to replace sovereign citizens with sovereign consumers.
This transition is the result of reforming democracy in favour of governance rather than
government. These new techniques of democracy, broadly known as New Public Management (NPM),
define government representatives as providers of services who are detached from the day-to-day
functioning of their political role which is, instead, performed by non-political actors [74]. As such,
politicians devolve the provision of services to politically autonomous agents (such as Quangos),
while simultaneously resisting any collective requests of the electorate that seek reform of public
provision outside of pre-established boundaries [60,74]. For the neoliberals, the majoritarian
system of voting leads to decisions being imposed on a minority who didn’t vote for them and
risks individual preferences becoming eclipsed by the bargaining and concessions needed for
democratic decision-making.
If the collective nature of such a democratic system forces individuals into conformity, then a
mechanism is required to realise the predilections of each of the participants. The market is advocated
by the neoliberals as the instrument to transmit individual inclinations accurately and to protect the
liberty of each participant. Therefore, neoliberalism in practice has attempted to privilege individual
liberty over collective political action by remoulding the concept of citizenship. A sovereign consumer,
unlike a sovereign citizen, is not restricted in their behaviour or value-preferences as they purchase
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what they desire without needing to deliberate with other political agents. In practice, implementing
the NPM approaches may paradoxically exacerbate the problems that the neoliberals identified with
democracy; individuals are likely to see a reduction in their choices of public services, and the
market—like bureaucracies—is likely to stifle the potential of imagining new policies by limiting
potential democratic outcomes to those that already exist [60].
Indeed, efforts to encourage young people to engage with formal politics via the introduction
of youth councils and the evolution of party youth wings is hampered by the consumer approach
to democracy [69,75]. Young people’s experiences of youth councils replicate the centralised and
hierarchical aspects they dislike within electoral participation. Rather than being active collaborators
within these forums, young people are treated as consumers to be consulted and are excluded from
active participation within major decisions that affect their lives. Youth councils, therefore, may not be
vehicles for social change or improving young people’s inclusivity, but, instead, provide legitimation
to politicians and political parties by signalling their (superficial) engagement with youth opinions [75].
Similarly, youth wings of political parties, despite rhetoric to the contrary, reproduce the notion that
citizenship represents responsibility to other citizens and the duty to vote rather than encouraging
active engagement with policy creation. While many young people favour active citizenship,
political parties have been reluctant to broaden democracy, preferring that youth wings provide
a consultative environment without mechanisms to create or influence change [69].
It would seem that the advance of consumer sovereignty further intensifies the disdain many
young people feel towards formal politics. As politicians internalise neoliberal guidelines, there follows
a shift in their position from governing to the oversight of services delivery; this is accompanied
by a growing homogeneity between political parties and by policy convergence. Appearance and
managerial qualities have begun to supersede policy and the function of representatives is being
increasingly limited to the efficient provision of services to sovereign consumers [74]. The gravitation
of political parties towards the political centre has occurred due to reductions in traditional ideological
identification and by parties attempting to maximise their vote share by attracting median voters [76].
Yet the convergence of UK political parties towards the centre also fulfils the function of enforcing
quasi-constitutional status for neoliberal economic rules that are free from democratic intervention.
Burnham characterises this depoliticisation as a “technocratic form of governance” which drives
“acceptance of rules rather than discretion, particularly in the area of monetary policy” [77] (p. 129).
Young people, however, have been critical of the uniform policies offered by political parties and
have cited the increasing similarity of political parties as a reason for avoiding electoral participation.
Moreover, contemporary youth have stated that political parties don’t offer policies which consider
the needs of young people [8,39], and this is likely to continue in a political system which consistently
prioritises the median voter and economic technocracy.
The adoption of a consumer approach to democracy and politics is also having a detrimental effect
on rates of formal political participation because of the relationship it introduces between the electorate
and politicians. While alternative forms of political engagement have been recognised as forming
an important and positive feature of young people’s political repertoires, such transitions to new
forms of politics are driven by the increasing individualisation within late modernity [54,55]. For Hay
and Stoker, this is problematic, as a furthering of individualism by neoliberalism, due to a consumer
approach to politics, is leading to disenchantment within the political process. The individualistic
tendencies encouraged by neoliberalism which attempt to negate the cooperative foundations of
deliberation that are necessary in politics is creating dissatisfaction amongst citizens as they fail to
recognise that democracy is about making collective decisions which will not satisfy all interested
parties [67]. As Hay and Stoker suggest, “[politics] is rarely an experience of self-actualisation and
more often an experience of accepting second-best” [67] (p. 234). If young people are being are being
socialised into believing that politics is a transaction based on individual choice in which a consumer’s
desires are met, then the reality of democracy in which agents must traverse complex topics without
any guarantee of satisfaction with the result, may become a frustrating experience.
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However, neoliberalism may be sowing the seed of its own destruction by encouragement of
individualistic approaches to political participation [22]. Citizens, particularly young people, are now
finding a contradiction between the individualism encouraged by neoliberalism and how formal
politics is organised under neoliberal ideology. This is why Bang has stated that “neoliberalism
is virtually committing suicide by attempting to erase the politics of ideas” and “control the
practices of network politics” [22] (p. 440). Neoliberalism’s subservience to powerful interests
and use of hierarchical policy exchange would therefore seem to be anathema to agents who,
under neoliberal ideology, have been encouraged to believe that sovereignty resides in the individual.
Bang, therefore, has identified how neoliberalism in practice contributes towards disillusionment with
politics, but also how it undermines its own legitimacy.
Bang, who analyses people from all age cohorts (rather than focusing specifically on young
people), states that the paradoxes of neoliberal governance have led to increasing concerns around
the legitimacy of contemporary political practices. This is because politics and government become
oppressive under the influence of neoliberalism. Neoliberalism is dependent on maintaining its
hegemony by threatening, sanctioning and coercing agents into acceptance of its authority. People may
accept these commands because of the threats which accompany them, rather than because they
consent to the legitimacy of current politics. For Bang, these threats are the hierarchical commands
which are forced upon society by the neoliberal political structure; they negate deliberation between
the citizenry and their representatives and they undermine the legitimacy of neoliberalism in the eyes
of the citizenry [22].
As a consequence, it is claimed by Bang that people are becoming cynical about the ability
of governments to resolve contemporary risks and difficulties, such as global warming. Nor are
agents satisfied that the market or technological advances can overcome these problems. New forms
of political action are driven by the individualism inherent in the roll-out of neoliberalism,
but, concurrently, are constrained by the coercive approach of neoliberal politics. The lack of autonomy
that is granted towards these new political repertoires augments the corrosion of trust manifested in
people’s increasing avoidance of formal politics. Agents are becoming increasingly aware that they do
not contribute towards the creation of policy and that their views are superseded by the instrumental
politics of latent groups who operate in what Bang terms the “backstage” of politics. In essence,
these backstage operators, whose ability to lobby governments far outweighs the ability of the public
to pressurise their representatives, have instrumental demands which do not align with the citizenry’s
concerns and which often exacerbate the difficulties that people are most concerned with [22].
Bang’s suggestions find support when reviewing young people’s concerns with formal politics.
Evidence suggests that a majority of British youth, though offering support to the ideals of democracy,
felt that they are unable to influence governments and that elections do not really change anything.
Furthermore, young people are often reluctant to engage with major political parties because they
appear remote, centralised and hierarchical [9,37]. If politics is constrained and directed by ‘backstage’
actors at the expense of young people, then it is likely that the political process will become even
less appealing. Indeed, the surge in youth voting at the 2017 General Election was partially due
to the personable style of campaigning adopted by the leader of the Labour Party which sought to
directly engage with voters. In contrast, the Conservative campaign—which, in the neoliberal mould,
relied on coercive commands from a centralised and hierarchical political apparatus—largely served
to repel many young people [78,79]. The coercive nature of political exchange between representatives
and the citizenry under neoliberalism has encouraged the feeling amongst young people that
politics is a hierarchical interaction in which they are expected to be compliant subjects rather than
active participants. Evidence suggests that due to the influence of neoliberalism, young people are
increasingly displaying individualistic political values and behaviour which favour a more direct
and reflexive relationship to politics [42]; the constraints on policy exchange means they are looking
beyond institutionalised participation which is subordinate to the wishes of powerful lobbyists,
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and are becoming attracted to newer forms of engagement which allow youth to realise their political
preferences [80].
New Public Management, the turn to consumer citizenship and the influence of
“backstage operators” are all forms of depoliticisation, in which political decisions are removed
from the public sphere and inserted into the private sphere. As many young people’s preference is for
a more direct form of democracy [11], depoliticisation of formal politics and its subsequent limiting
of political interactions encourages youth to search for new sites to realise their political value and
behaviour. Indeed, the manner in which politics is conducted has undergone significant changes under
neoliberal hegemony and, consequently, many young people have revised their attitudes towards
engagement. Bang’s descriptions of the malign effects that neoliberalism has on the practice of politics
provides invaluable insights into why young people dislike politics. The legitimacy of governments is
often undermined by the coercive and hierarchical approach neoliberalism adopts to policy exchange.
Young people, furthermore, are increasingly favouring direct and egalitarian forms of political action
which are at odds with a political system that relies on deference to backstage operators. While all
age cohorts are disadvantaged by a political system which privileges those who are able to command
more political influence due to their large resources, young people’s increasing preference for closer
interaction magnifies the constraints on policy which is formed from the bottom up. Moreover, if large
potential areas of public concern are depoliticised and free from democratic debate, many young
people whose preference is for closer forms of political collaboration may become less motivated to
engage. As neoliberal governments do not facilitate a greater association between citizenry and their
representatives, some young people have started to engage with alternative forms of political action to
realise their aspirations.
6. Economic Disadvantage and Political Disenfranchisement
The implementation of neoliberal policies—which are predicated on the free market,
non-redistribution of wealth and a reduced role for the state—are also a significant dynamic which
contribute to patterns of youth political engagement. The adoption of neoliberalism by mainstream
political parties in the UK has led to significant restructuring of the economic system which has reversed
the increasing economic equality witnessed during the early postwar decades. Since 1979, social and
economic inequalities have risen significantly [81] and have had a particularly disproportionate and
negative effect on young people [82]. Moreover, the consolidation of wealth to a limited minority has
meant that the wealthy are in control of the political agenda. As Birch et al. state, “[t]he experience
of recent decades has left the impression that the rich can pressure governments by threatening to
take their wealth elsewhere” [23] (p. 4), which supports Bang’s concern about backstage operators.
This final section will demonstrate in more detail how this youth generation have lost out under
neoliberal economic policy. It will also establish how the subsequent stratifying effects impact on
young people both in terms of increasing their likelihood to abstain at future electoral contests and of
leading them to question their role as citizens.
The changes to monetary policy which arose from the transition to neoliberal economics have
seen certain social groups in the UK experience a decrease in income. The increase in the size of
the British economy during this period has not meant that all citizens have seen a proportionate
increase in their income or living standards; in reality, some groups have been subject to significant
economic marginalisation [23]. This has been particularly evident for young people following the
implementation of governmental austerity policies since 2010, reflecting a neoliberal response to the
global economic crisis. In particular, analyses reveal that the 16 to 24 year-old group has suffered more
than any other group from cuts in social spending in welfare and investment in public services [23].
However, young people were suffering from stagnating wages before the financial crisis and it
is becoming increasingly likely that poor pay progression is now an enduring structural feature
of the British economy, rather than a cyclical phase. Indeed, the average starting wage of those
aged 17–20 have, since the early 1990s, been far lower than previous generations [83]. The housing
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market in Britain, driven by neoliberal reforms, is also contributing to young people’s economic
marginalisation. For today’s young people, social housing is harder to achieve than previously and
home-ownership is dominated by older age cohorts. Consequently, young people are having to
live in privately rented accommodation which is both more expensive and insecure compared to
previous decades due to neoliberal housing reforms and deregulation [84]. Young people’s worsening
socioeconomic environment, therefore, is driven by neoliberalism in practice and decreases their
likelihood of voting [2].
While it is true that politicians—whose potential policies are generally limited by economic
realities—will rationally target social groups which are more likely to vote, this has the counter-effect
of neglecting non-voting groups such as the poor, ethnic minority communities and especially young
people. As politicians prioritise social groups most likely to vote, the needs of non-voting groups
are often overlooked, furthering their resentment of politics and making them even less likely to
vote. Thus, political inequality leads to economic inequality through the targeting of government
spending; in turn, this increases political inequality as social groups, who are effectively ignored in
political discussions, see little importance or value in voting. It is claimed that this disproportionate
generational impact and the spiral of economic and political marginalisation has contributed towards
decreasing levels of political participation amongst British youth [23,30].
The changes in many young people’s economic situation has created a destabilising effect
on the transition from youth to adulthood. Markers of adulthood, such as home ownership,
stable employment and settled locality, have become increasingly problematic for young people
to achieve. Reductions in wages and benefits for young people are compounded by the move to
post-industrial forms of production under neoliberalism, which are typified by low wages and a
lack of job security [2,27]. Consequently, young people are experiencing a delay in their life cycle
compared to previous generations [85]. This influences young people’s political participation in two
ways. First, agents are more likely to engage when they feel they have a personal stake in policy
proposals. For instance, a homeowner will be more concerned with changes to interest rates than a
person who does not possess their own home. Second, individuals are more likely to become aware
of, and engage with, political issues if they traverse settings in which concerns with social issues are
shared with others. So, for instance, a settled homeowner is more likely to become involved in local
and community political action and a parent more likely to be recruited into action over education [85].
While the life cycle effect has often been accompanied by the claim that young people are choosing to
delay the transition to adulthood, it would be more accurate to understand these difficulties as arising
from exogenous socioeconomic changes which young people are required to comply with [86].
The inequality which neoliberal polices have engendered also contributes to decreasing levels
of young people’s political engagement. Material inequality is particularly pronounced for young
people and the resulting economic stratification forms a barrier to participation for some of those
young people. Inequality reduces political participation for those who are less affluent amongst
all age cohorts. Societies which have large disparities of wealth create political environments in
which very rich individuals tend to dominate at the expense of those with lower incomes [87,88].
Indeed, contemporary working-class British youth are less interested in political affairs, have less
confidence in their own political knowledge, are more critical of the value of elections and offer
less support to democracy than their middle-class counterparts [8]. Inequality reduces political
participation amongst the less wealthy because they have less access to resources or networks which
facilitate or encourage engagement, they hold less influence over the direction of politics relative
to those who are wealthier and they are more likely to suffer the consequences of unequal societies
(such as poor health) [89]. Not only do neoliberal policies create inequality which leads to declining
levels of participation, the move to replace sovereign citizens with sovereign consumers intensifies
such inequalities by predicating political influence on economic power. The transition to consumer
sovereignty erases the formal equality of citizen sovereignty by introducing the stratifying effect of
private capital into democratic principles, which contributes to young people’s disenfranchisement.
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Worryingly for young people, redistributive polices which would reverse concentrations of wealth and
political power are unlikely to appear if political influence is limited to those who will gain little from
more egalitarian access to participation.
While thus far we have examined how neoliberal ideas have influenced the material reality of
young people which subsequently leads to their scepticism over politics, it is important to understand
how the contradictions between their economic conditions and notions of citizenship have influenced
the ideas that young people have towards democracy. Under neoliberal hegemony, responsibility for
success or failure resides within the individual and it is regarded that any form of dependency could be
prevented if the agent had made the correct choice [16]. Moreover, Western societies promote a form of
citizenship which should include engagement with institutionalised forms of politics. As we have seen,
however, due to the increasingly difficult financial environment which young people are subjected to,
they find it hard to be active citizens and have little choice in their predicament. Young people have
become increasingly aware of the paradox between the expectations which surround them and the
tools available to them to achieve these expectations [16,42]. Indeed, over a quarter of young people in
the UK do not feel in control of their lives, a third believe that their standards of living will be worse
than their parents and over 40 percent are sceptical about their ability to gain secure employment and
home ownership [90].
This escalates the tension between young people and electoral politics as the former are
condemned for not participating nor contributing to positive social outcomes, while experiencing
neglect from their representatives and a reduction in opportunities which galvanise political
engagement. The reflexivity available to young people in post-industrial societies has often been
overemphasised at the expense of understanding the limits to which young people can act freely.
As Furlong and Cartmel explain, “although the collective foundations of social life have become more
obscure, they continue to provide powerful frameworks which constrain young people’s experiences
and life chances” [59] (p. 138). While young people may be adopting new patterns of political
behaviour, the claim that they are making this choice free from coercion neglects to consider the
changes in socioeconomic conditions due to neoliberal restructuring which restrict or remove the
options available to them.
The shifts in the socioeconomic conditions within neoliberal societies and the resulting inequalities
have created barriers to young people’s political participation. Inequality has an adverse influence
on the political participation of those who are in the lower wage brackets amongst all age cohorts.
Young people are disproportionality represented in lower income groups due to life cycle effects
and governmental decisions about budget allocations. On the one hand, young people’s exposure to
spending cuts is partially the result of their low electoral turnout and of the behaviour of politicians who
rationally target resources at those who will provide their parties with votes and political power. On the
other hand, the removal of state support from contemporary youth and a transfer of such support
to older generations undermines the formal equality of politics. It essentially disenfranchises young
people by increasing their disadvantage compared to their older contemporaries. So, while young
people are disadvantaged compared to the older generations in contemporary society, they are also
facing more difficult circumstances than their older contemporaries were confronted with when they
themselves were young and beginning adulthood—current older generations had previously received
state support and had easier access to markers of adulthood when in their youth. As we can see,
the material situation that neoliberalism creates effectively discourages some young people from
participating. It is also possible, however, to see how the paradox between the normative and moral
judgements which neoliberalism encourages about individual failure and the increased likelihood of an
individual failing because of neoliberal economic policy encourages declining participation. This opens
young people to question the value of their role as citizens or the necessity of engaging with politics.
Indeed, it may be further evidence of the inter-connectedness of neoliberal rationalisation and the
effects of neoliberal-influenced socioeconomic changes on rates of young people’s political engagement.
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7. Conclusions
It would seem that neoliberalism has a particularly strong impact on young people’s political
behaviour and why many of them seem to feel estranged from formal electoral politics. We have sought
to establish how this occurs through various and different facets of neoliberalism. The remoulding
of democracy to make it compatible with neoliberalism, the subsequent change that neoliberal logic
imposed on political practice, and the inequality arising from neoliberal economic policy each have
demonstrable negative outcomes on the relationship between young people and institutional political
engagement. Furthermore, it would be mistaken to try and understand the effects of each component
we have discussed in isolation; it is only through their interdependency that we can understand
how each influences youth political participation. The neoliberal critique of democracy and its
prominence in mainstream consciousness have been an important element in creating dissatisfaction
with contemporary politics; however, the reductions in state support and deepening inequality for
young people is also a significant driver of this scepticism. Moreover, their precarious material reality
combined with the dominant neoliberal value judgements over failure and avoiding dependency
provide contradictory experiences of citizenship for young people. If we are to understand how
neoliberalism influences young people’s patterns of institutional political participation, we must
attempt to understand how neoliberalism rationalises individuals into certain patterns of thought,
how neoliberal values modify democracy, and how socioeconomic changes arising from neoliberalism
mediate access to political participation. While there are other competing claims in understanding
young people’s increasing rejection of electoral politics, we have presented important reasons to
suggest that neoliberalism should be included in this discussion.
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